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A. Introduction
As it has been described earlier ~1-7 the present pr~se of the
Karlsruhe Fast Breeder Project extends to 1967 and is aimed towards
the investigation of the feasibility of 1000 r~e fast breeder reactors.
One principal coolant being considered is sodium. The purpose of the
present Karlsruhe study i-2_7, called Na-I, of a 1000 MWe sodium
cooled breeder reactor \las to serve as a reference design. On the
basis of this reference design the frequently discussed competition
between breeding, safety and economy is being explored in a fashion
which is as much quantitatively as possible. It is in particular the
impact of safety on breeding and economy which is being studied. A
first set of results has been presented yesterday by Smidt ~3-7.
The proper choice of a design basis accident (DBA) and its impact on
capital costs is being explored right now. All this will serve as the
basis of a Na-2-study. It is therefore this forthcoming Na-2-study
instead of the present Na-l-study which could Serve as a basis for
a thorough safety evaluation in the style of a safety report.
It is the purpose of this paper to describe the present Na-I-design
and its safety features with respect to incidents,the maximum
hypothetical accident (MHA) and the DBA, in view of the forthcoming
Na-2-study.
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B. A Description of the Karlsruhe Na-l-Reference Design
A detailed description of the Na-I-design i5 given in a Karlsruhe
publication L-2_7. It also has been described for the recent Detroit
Conference L-4-!. The descriptions should be considered as a background
for this chapter.
The,.taöle:;of ,the Aprendix givesthe most important data of the Na-l-
design.
1. Choice of Fuel
The fuel for Na-l are the mixed oxides U02/Pu02 . The design objective
was to arrive at fuel cycle costs below 1 mill/kWh. Tbis can be met
without difficulties by the use of the oxides L-5_7. The advantages
of using other types of fuel such as the carbides whou1d 1ie therefore
in the areas of breeding including the aspect of lowering the fuel cycle
costs or capital costs. We will touch that point later. The choice for
U02/EU02 as a fuel is consistent with the Karlsruhe approach of also
looking for H20-steam cooling. This coolant excludes the use of the
carbides. Commonly realized is the advantage of having available the
technology of U02 as a fuel. The technology of UC is less developed
and somewhat more difficult. Realizing the fact that this fast reactor
fuel development is the first large scale fuel development at Karlsruhe
the advantage of the better known and more easy technology of U02/Pu02
was compelling.
One further argument for the oxides should be mentioned because it is
used only seldomly: Suppose that A is the heat conductivity of the fuel
in the rod of diameter R and ~ is the heat conductivity in the gap.
Then the "effective" heat conductivity A
eff acting along the temperature
difference: center of fuel - cladding i5
A A 2o:R
eff o:R + 2f...
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If ~~ is small. then ~eff :~aR.~~ fo~ a fast reactor fuei rod with
carbide fuel is small for threc re~sons: 1) R of a.fp.st reactor rod
is small. the situation is different for thermal reactors. 2) the
problem of inner corrosion bctwcen fuel a~d clad is more serlous for
the carbides than for the oxides and afflicts the value of a. 3) the
high value of ~ in case of the carbides emphasizes the difficulties
f tt ' bl d t' 't aR. t ro ge lng a compara _e con uc lVl y "2-:...n •.e gap.
2. Choice of Cladding ani Structur~l M~!erialG
In the four recent 1000 f7/:e stuä.:::"es al1stenitic stainless steel wi th
preference to SS 316 and 304 re2pectively has been chosen as cladding
materials. In the Na-1-study wc took Incoloy 800 as a reference point
for advanced Incoloy-types. On the othe~ r-and SS 16 13 CrNi as basic
alloy for high creep strength stainless steel i3 alternative and
,. -- ~--- _.- > --
might possibly be uscd in ~h~ Na-2-cesign. These two types of alloys
seem to us to be the most promising. more than the above mentioned
316 and 304 types. vle e:;:pect the'3e relatively lc:'l Ni-alloys to have
on one side an acceptable corrosion-be~aviol1r respecting mass transfer
and on the other side DO: to te harm:ul with respect to the neutronics.
The neutronic evaluations 1'Ti th c.:r first choicc Incoloy 800 having the
larger Ni-content of the considered choices ShOi'led that there is no
great neutronie penalty for thc usa 0: such alloys.
The sodium temperatures ar~ lowrr than in the Arr.erican studies. The
mean Na outlet teoperatu~e is 5300 e (instead of 600-65ooe in the US
studies). If the hot channel facto~ is included the maxiou!TI outlet
temperature of sodiQm is 6~ooC in our study. The mean inlet sodium
temperature of the s teao- ge:lerator amount3 t::en to 560oe thus leading
to a steam temperature of 5400c. The sodiuo outlet temperature of the
steam-generator was ~aken ~8 )500e. the iniot ~er.p3rature into the
core will be 4300e.
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Having fixed these temperatures one now can make a proper choice of
the structural materials. The first choice is,of course, austenitic
steel on the hot side of the loops: X 8 CrNiNb 1613 is the only stain-
less steel which is allowed for high temperature use in Germany. But
for economic reasons we would prefer SS 304 or 316 and will discuss
this question with our supervising authorities to get possibly the
license for this material. We are also taking into consideration the
Nb-stabilized ferritic steel 10 CrMoNbNi 910 advocated by the INTER-
ATOM-group. We expect further economic gains using this steel in case
it will prove to be successful. Furthermore we think it would be the
most economic solution to use normal unstabilized ferritic steel
10 CrMo 910 for all cold parts of the loops with temperatures below
450°C. As you will see even the reactor vessel might be manufactured
using this relatively cheap steel and also for the concentric in- and
outlet tubes to the heatexchangers this cheap ferritic steel may be
used. The most difficult part of the sodium circuits with respect to
materials are surely the tubes of the steam-generator for which we
have no simple solution at hand. We think of a combined solution of
normal ferritic steel for the evaporator section and austenitic steel
for the superheater part of the steam-generator. (In this point the
data of our study are misleading. Not an alternative but a combination
of the austenitic and ferritic steel is intended.)
3. The Core Design
Originally a number of rather inconventional core designs were con-
sidered, for example spherical fuel elements of canned oxide fuels.
But after considerable discussion we arrived at a design with conven-
tional pins in an hexagonal subassembly. The basic argument was over
all simplicity. The core has two zones of two enrichments optimized
for power flattening. This results in two core zones of the same
volume. It gives automatically also a good Doppler coefficient (7.10-6
at 1400 °C) because the center zone has the lower enrichment. The
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Na-void effect is acceptable. This point will be touched later. After
considerable parametric studies the H/D ratio was chosen to be 1/3.
It did not appear to be necessary to go to more extreme values or
other extreme solutions in order to enhance leakage. A H/D value of
1/3 does not decrease the Doppler coefficient too strongly and also
does not influence the fabrication costs of the fuel cycle too much.
As will be pointed out in chapter 7. a core of a lew H/D value may
lead to somewhat lewer values of the kinetic energy release in case
of a major accident. The fission gases are given to agas pler.um at
the lower end of the core. Therefore we have a vented to plenum scheme.
The aspects of a vented to coolant scheme are evaluated in a paper
of Sommer and Smidt here at this conference L-6-!. There seem to be
no major economical advantages but an improvement of safety. We come
to this point later. The radial blanket has also UIO regions, the
euter region uses U-metal in order te reduce the size ef the radial
blanket (40 cm), but for reasens of the fuel cycle this appears not
to be a good solution. This leads to the core arrangement shown in
fig. 1.
The reason for having the plenum for the fission gases at the lower
end is the lower sodium te~perature. This, leads to 80 cm length of
plenum and saves about 25 cm of plenum length. Therefore the height
of the subassembly is reduced and also the pressure drop of the sodium
along the subassembly is smaller and requires therefore somewhat less
structural material. Besides of that the thermal stresses in the sub-
assembly are lower because the plenum does not participate in the
displacement of the upper parts of the subassembly. The coolant frac-
tion (a) in both core zones 1s 50 0/0 . The leading argument for that
choice was the rather low value of the pressure drop in the core
(4.25 k~) which in turn reduces the necessary volume fraction for
cm 0the structural materials (10 /0). The variation of the coolant frac-
tion has been discussed at a different place ~3-7.
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The fuel subassemblies are fixed in a lower grid plate, the hold down
is hydraulic, the direction of coolant flow is upward. Originally the
direction of coolant flow was discussed at length, but among other
reasons the direction of natural eonvection and the pressure of the
cover gas lead to the upward flow.
Much attention was paid to the question of refueling (see fig. 2a - c).
There are three loading deviees in region above the core, each covers
1/3 of the core and blanket area. Normal operation takes place under
sodium and makes use of power steering. As long as everything is in
order, quick loading and unloading is easily achieved therefore. In
case of a mechanical failure the prineiple of power steering immediately
deteets this. Now it is possible to lower the level of the sodium pool
and to have optical access to the upper core surface by a periscope
device. Appropriate measures are now possible. Lowering of the Na level
is possible because the Na pool above the care i5 a mixing chamber.
Presently 90 % of the outcoming flow of the core i5 taken away from
the outlet nozzles by thin vertical plates, only 10 % of the flow
reaches the outlet point directly. This deereases the effect of tempe-
rature shoeks to the sodium containing walls. And the vertical plates
aet as walls in ease the Na level is lowered, therefore sort of a
under flow hot oell with optical aecess by a periseope deviee is
established in this case. The unloaded subassemblies are given to
waiting and transfer baskets at the outer perimeter of the radial
blanket, from there they are taken away after a eooling-off period of
100 days by a rather simple device.
The number of three loading devices might lead to very short inter-
ruptions for refueling. As long as more than one loading per year
appears to be necessary this may be of great importance for the question
of availability. In our case we have a rating of 1 k ~~h t and ag lSS ma
three bateh loading scheme leading to refueling periods of 196 days.
This is reasonable but not yet in eoineidence wi th the yearly ma.inte-~. "
nance cycle and therefore very short interruptions for refueling are
desirable.
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It is probably more important to look for refueling periods of one year
rather than for high ratings if they are associated with short refuel1ng
perlods. The fuel cost benefit of such high ratings may be obtained only
if apower refueling appears possible. This possibility should not be
excluded for future reactor studies. however.
A refueling period of one year could increase the economic potential of
the plant. Such aperiod can be obtained with high values of the excess
reactivity. this at least in most cases hurts breeding and economy except
the internal breeding ratio is somewhat larger than one.
In our case the excess reactivity for bridging a burn-up of 1003000 MWd/to
is 2.4 0/0 • This value is the sum of Pu burn-up (0.75 0/0) and fission
product.poisenlng (1.65 0/0 ). the internal breeding ratio is 0.89 (inner
zone 0.556, outer zone 0.334).
The nuclear core calculation use an equilibrium composition of Pu iso-
topes ~7-7. This equilibrium composit1on is such, that only that amount
of freshly bred Pu from the blankets goes to the core. which 1s necessary
for making up the Pu burn-up in the core. This with all probability will
not be the scheme for Na-2. It 1s intended to have a mixed core-blanket
aqueous reprocessing scheme instead. After one refueling period, l of
n
the core and in of the radial blanket would be mixed together in the
process line. If the internal breeding ratio is in the neighbourhood of
one, this leads to one unique Pu isotope composition at all stages of the
fuel cycle and there would be no Pu hold up in the radial blanket.
4. The Design of the Primary Circuit
The primary circuit is of the loop-type. Having a large reactor, a pool
type might have serlous problems, such as unforseen flow patterns, thermal
stresses in the structural plates for the pumps and the heat exchanger,
radial expansion of the components in the pool with respect to the concrete
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shield plug, difficulties of having easy access for maintenance and for
heavy instrumentation and others. A solution of the loop-type can be
bet~rcverlookedand the design is more straight forward. But it is not
excluded that ultimately the pool type is the right choice.
The loop type solution of Na-l provides two parallel circuits, that means
two intermediate heat exchangers. Each circuit has two pumps in parallel
which makes a total of four. A higher number of heat exchangers does not
seem advisable because this component should be a reliable one and a
higher number of heat exchangers could perhaps even increase the failure
probability. In the same sense the number of four for the pumps is
assumed to be something like an optimum. The suspensions of heat ex-
changer together with the pumps provide for radial expansion thus going
into the direction of a good type feature. All components of the primary
circuit are in chambers of a concrete structure. The heavy motor drives
for the Na-pumps are above the main floor, that means they are borne
directly by the concrete structure, whereas the pumps themselves are
directly connected with the intermediate heat exchanger. The reactor
tank itself has a double wall~in~orgeErtacgua~änteealways'the sodium
level is above the reactor core. Convection from the reactor vessel to
the intermediate heat exchanger provides a coolant flow large enough to
pick up about 7 ~o of the nominal heat production. As a first order
approximation it was assumed that there will be no main primary pipe
failure. Together with the cooling capability of natural convection
this eliminates the necessity of an emergency cooling system. As we
will see later on too, the Na-I-design does not make too pessimistic
assumptions in order to study the capital cost potential of this kind
of a reactor. The systems and safety analysis of Na-l may well lead to
the necessity of having an emergency cooling circuit for the coolant of
the reactor vessel of the Na-2-study.
All main pipes are co-axial. Therefore it is possible to have all outer
pipe walls and all the containers at the same temperature, namely that
of the sodium entrance, 430 oe. On the other hand this leads tp great
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difficulties in having gate valves at the exit of the reactor vessel.
Consistent with the assumption of not having a main pipe break no gate
valves were provided in the Na-I-design. This is also subject to a
careful re-evaluation for Na-2.
The reactor tank is located excentrically in the containment building
in o~der to have a small diameter (28 m) of the reactor building.
The secondary circuit leaves the reactor building, steam-generators
and turbines are outside.
The cover gas of the primary circuit is Argon.
Generally one can say that advantage is taken by the fact of the low
pressure drop of the primary circuit (5 kp/cm2 ). This together with the
fact of the rather low constant overall temperature (430 °C) for vessels,
containers and the outer wall of the main pipes leads to the possibility
to use perhaps a cheap ferritic material for these components. The
20 ~~e KNK-reactor at Karlsruhe is designed along this line of arguments.
5. The Neutronic Evaluation
The neutronic evaluation was done in several steps. First a parametric
survey study was performed in calculating a large number of one-dimen-
sional - one core zone reactor configuration. The results of these one-
dimensional reactor calculations were checked against 8 two-dimensional -
one core region reactors which fit thermodynamically in the scope of the
design. The calculation of this stage used a slightly modified 16 group
YOM set for the one-dim~nsional calculationsj for the 8 two-dimensional
calculations a conden~ation into 5 groups was necessary for reasons of
computer time. In the process of condensation different weighting spectra
were used for the core, the axial and the radial blanket. These spectra
were obtained by one- and two-dimensional calculations and the results
obtained after the condensation were cross checked and appeared to be
satisfactory.
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A second step was the neutronic calculation and optimization of the two
region core. Again the 16 group YOM set, always in a slightly modified
version, was used. The optimization was done with respect to the power
flattening using proper enrichment in the two zones. This optimum
appeared, when the two core regions were of the same volume. These core
dimensions and enrichments were used for the reference reactor. As
mentioned before, the Pu isotopic composition was that of an equilibrium
core with separate core-blanket management.
Having these first datas for the reference reactor at hand a great effort
was started to calculate this reactor very carefully. The results which
were at first calculated with a one-dimensional code were cross checked
against a 5 group two-dimensional S-2-calculation. The agreement was
quite good. Thereafter the calculatlon was repeated with the 26 group
Russian set because this group set had all materials of interest available
as selfshielded, temperature dependent group constants, including fission
products. During that step also the details of the flux distribution in
particular in the radial blanket were considered.
The third step was to calculate the power and energy coefficients. The
Doppler coefficient was calculated by means of the Karlsruhe code DeP
(Doppler Coefficient by Perturbation) using as spectrum the results cal-
culated with the 26 Russian group constants set (ASN). The neutron life-
-time and ß
eff was calculated on the basis of the 16 group modified YOM
set. The Na-void effect was calculated again using a two-dimensional code
"Twenty Ground" and 6 neutron group coming from a condensation of the
Russian 26 group set. The results were compared, with the corresponding
one-dimensional results. The difference of the two maximal Na-void effects
o
was less than 10 /0 (compare table 1 + 2).
Table 1: Na-void effects
(One-dimensional calculation by using the ASN-set)
Void (1) Void (1+2) Void overall Void max.
ök 0.01032 0.00641 0.005445 0.011747
~ 2.87 $ 1.78 $ 1.655 $ 3.27 $
(1) and (2) referring to zone 1 and 2, (max.) to r< 118 cm.
Table 2:
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Na-void effects
(Two-dimensional calculations by using a 6 group set
coming from a condensation of the ASN set)
Void (1) Void (1+2) Void overall Void max.
ö.k 0.00654 0.00375 - 0.00479 0.01108
~ 1.8104 $ 1.037 ;6 - 1.326 ;6 3.066 $
One should note the difference in sign for the overall effect. This
throws a light on the calculational diffieulties which still exist.
Mueh attention was paid to proper burn-up ealeulation. The basis was a
model for batch loading. Local groups of n subassemblies were formed.
Each subasaembly of these loeal groups belongs to a different bateh.
Unloading of a subassembly appears at the neighbourhood of 100.000 MV/d/to.
If the number of batehes is n J the average burn-up in the loeal groups
100.000
varies only for between two successive refueling steps. A choice
n
was made to have n 3 in the inner zone and the inner region of the
outer zone and n = 4 in the outer region of the outer zone. This leads to
196 d 0 due to Pua fuel lifetime of 3 and a reaetivity change of 0.7 /0
0burn-uPJ if fission products are ineluded it will be 2.5 /0.
Table 3: The effeets of fuel burn-up for var10us numbers of batches
Number of batches b k
eff Average to Time differencein the inner and maximum n) between succes-outer zone of the without fission burn-up sive refueling
feore fission produets steps
products included
inner zone 0.76 0/0 0n=3 - 79 /0
outer zone
196 d
inner zone: n=3
0.74 0/0 0 85 0/0
outer zone: 2.5 /0
inner region n=3
outer region n=4
*)Calculation by using the ABN set
**)averaged over the radius r
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The choice of n = 3 and n = 4 in the outer zone of the core instead of
n = 3 in the whole core increases the average to maximum burn-up by 6 0/0 •
Finally reactivity values were calculated on the basis of aperturbation
theory for the interchange of a subassembly of the outer with inner zone
and for the Na-voiding of the central subassembly.
The described procedure lead to the values published in ~2-7, but the
calculation of the reference design is being improved continuously.
The new results are calculated with the KFK-26-group constants set
described by H. Kusters in this conference L-9_7. This set has the
same group structure as the ABN set but starts from different micros-
copie data and uses a typical spectrum of a sodium cooled 1000 MWe
reactor as weighting spectrum. The main changes in the results are the
following:
o
critical mass i5 inereased by about 6 /0
the Doppler coefficient is decreased by about 25 0/0
the maximum Na-void reactivity value increases from about 3 $
to about 7 $.
6. The Accident Analysis
The accident analysis for the Na-1-design is now under way. It is not
ineluded in L-2_7, only a very first version is indicated there. First
results of the accident analysis are reported by Smidt et alii during
this conference L-3_7. Therefore this chapter refers explicitly to this
presentation.
The basic approach for the accident analysis comes from a look into
possibilities for aceidents. Ta begin with we have four basic types
of aceidents:
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a) loss of coolant flow
b) accidental reactivity ramp insertions
c) major Na pipe breaks
d) plugging of the central (or an inner) subassembly.
a) The loss of coolant flow accidents happens if all four pumps fail.
This is the case if the regular power supply and that of the emergency
drive fails. If in addition, as a third coincidence, the safety system
fails, tbe analysis indicates that one has a time intervall of 80 sec,
before Na-boiling appears. After this time intervall a Na-voiding
accident is to be expected. We come to this point later. One can argue
about the probability of a simultaneous mechanical failure. In that
event only one further conditioned event, namely that of the failure
of the safety system has to happen. But counting the simultaneous
mechanical failure of all four pumps and in particular that of the
safety system is a picture which is too rough, because these events
are in themselves multi-conditioned. In agreement with other assumptionsconc.
the mechanical design (see chapter 4.) we assume that there will be no
such simultaneous mechanical failure. This leads to the conclusion that
in the two conditioned case of pump failure (regular and emergency
drive failure) the safety system has to act within 80 sec.
b) Accidental reactivity insertions can happen in the beginning of a
sequence of events or as the consequence of Na-voiding or core compaction.
Na-voiding and core compaction lead to high values of the associated
ramp rates (10 - 100 $/sec) whereas the reactivity insertions in the
beginning of a sequence of events lead to low values of ramp rates.
For example the loading accident for a central 6ubassembly gives
0.7 $ in 350 msec, that is 2 $/sec.
Or the Na-voiding of the central subassembly leads to a change of
0.07 $ in, say, 100 msec, resulting in a ramp rate of 0.7 $/sec. The
size of an accidental reactivity insertion by a control rod run away
depends on the particular design, but will be always at ramp rates
below 1 $/sec.
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In the analysis of reactivity insertions the class of ramps between
o and 20 $/sec was considered. It is useful to make two distinctions.
If a reactivity input is below 1 $ the resulting excursion is reacti-
vity value limited, it is largely the total reactivity value and not
so much the ramp rate which determines the size of the excursion. If
the reactivity is larger than 1 $ it i8 in the region beyond 1 $ the
ramp rate and not the final reactivity value, which determines the size
of the excursion. The other distinction is that between low ramp rates
leading to Na-boiling before fuel starts melting or vaporization and
ramp rates leading to fuel melting or vaporization befo~e Na starts
boiling. The limiting ramp rate for this disctinction is a function of
the reactor properties, in particular the Doppler c08fficient and the
average fuel temperature. In certain c~ses instead of Na-boiling
cladding melting can be the relevant criterion.
The reactivity insertion, which the reactor can accept without action
of the safety system is 0.25 $. These are rather weak insertions. For
all other insertions stronger than that (reactivity value and ramp rate)
the scram by a safety system is required. Therefore the logical question
is now: What kind of a safety system is required. The detailed studies
of Smidt et alii L-3-1 give the answer fo~ the N~-l-design in form of
a parametrie study. The result is that for a delay time in the safety
system of 50 msec and a realistic shut down reactivity versus time
characteristic having 150 $/sec ramp rate in its linear part and having
a Doppler coefficient of 6 . 10-6 at 1400 °K results in apermitted
accidental reactivity ramp of 10 $/sec if the beginning of melting is
the limit. The value of 150 %/sec assumes, of course, that all shut off
rods are in action (10 rods at 1.5 $ each). A dclay time of 50 msec is
a rather high value and means that more or less conventional shut off
systems can be applied. If the delay time would b8 10 msec, instead of
10 $/sec about 14 $/sec could bc handled. The influence of the Doppler
coefficient is limited here. The reason is, that its action reduces the
net reactivity to values close to one dollar if the ramp insertion has
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led to reactivity values larger than one dollar. Before prompt criti-
cality is reached, the Doppler is of very small influence because the
large periods of the power level increase do not change the fuel tem-
peratu~e during that period. If A = T ~ i8 the Doppler constant, AT
the permissible fuel temperature intervall in the case of an excursion
and T the fuel temperature at normal operation and r the accidental
o s
ramp rate, the time t to fuel melting or vaporization has the character-
s
istic:
1 + A·ln (1 +~)
t~
s r
s
Only if A . In (1 + ~T) gives a significant contribution compared to
o
one the Doppler has a stronger influence on the characteristics of the
safety system. That is the case for carbide fuel at low rod power. At
50 msec delay time, a Doppler coefficient of 4 . 10-6 leads to 9.3 $/sec,
a Doppler coefficient of 8.5 . 10-6 to only 10.5 $/sec permissible
accidental ramp rate. The function of the Doppler coefficient is there-
fore to serve as an inherent safety mechanism against supercritical
fast reactivity insertions and particularly to guarantee stability. The
impact of the incertainties in the nuclear calculation cf the Doppler
coefficient on the design of the safety system 1s limited.
One important conclusion to be drawn from these arguments is that an
inconventional safety system with very short delay times (1 msec or so)
is required only in the case of accidental reactivity ramps much larger
than, say, 20 $/sec. But it is difficult to think of such accidental
ramp rates in the beginning of a sequence of events. Only Na-voiding
of the core cculd give larger values, but here in this line of arguments
Na-voiding is only a consequence of accidents which are accompanied by
a failure of the safety s~~m. We therefore conclude that for the safety
system a conventional version of it is sufficient. This differs from
the earlier Karlsruhe thinking.
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Wrether the event of an aceidental ramp reaetivity insertion is simple
eonditioned or two eonditioned ean be subjeet f9r a more detailed safety
diseussion but it is of no importanee here in this eontext.
e) Major Na-pipe breaks between the reaetor vessel and the intermediate
heat exehanger interrupt the eireuit of natural eonveetion for a primary
eireuit of the loop type. Sueh a break would require shut down and emer-
geney eooling in the vessel.
Aeeording to the arguments of ehapter 4. sueh a major break of a pipe is
exeluded in the Na-l-study by definition. The fortheoming Na-2-study might
eventually take up this point. The reaetor vessel itself has a double
wall and th~refore a break is definitely exeluded.
d) Before going to the aeeident of a major Na-voiding of the eore, the
aecident of the plugging in the eentral subassembly shall be considered.
If such a plugging takes plaee the response ef the neutron flux might be
very small due to the lew reaetivity value of Na-voiding of the eentral
subassembly. No reaetion of the safety system therefore takes plaee and
the Na ef the eentral subassembly might start boiling. Smidt has empha-
sized ~3-7, that e.g. in the ease of the Na-I-design at 28 % of
normal flow, boiling ef the Na oeeurs, but already at 22 % of the
normal flew unstable flow conditions may oeeur thus keeping the eoolant
in the ehannel. This leads to the beginning of a more serious sequenee
ef accidental events whieh will be diseussed in the next ehapter. One
ean argue that boiling ean perhaps be deteeted aeustieally and therefore
be used as an initiation of a seram signal. As long as the safety system
works this kind of an aecident might be prevented therefore.
But it is also possible that the sodium superheats and does not boil
~3_7. This can possibly not be detected by an instrumentation. There-
after sudden desuperheating may well lead to destruction of the eentral
subassembly and its neighbours thus giving a major core damage ending
up in a serious eore explosion. This will be discussed in the next
ehapter.
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This difficulty of an undetectable plugging and superheating accident is
considered to be an open point and so far an unresolved problem in the
realm of the assumption of an uneffected safety system.
In order to attack this problem much more has to be known on the mecha-
nism of two phase flow and superheat both theoretically and experimen-
tally. The paper of Fischer and Häfele L-lo_1 and that of Friz ~11-7
are considered to be a first step in this direction. Along the same
lines one also has to fear a break of the cladding at the fission gas
plenum. This also might lead to a propagation and result in a plugging
of the coolant channel. This danger is somewhat emphasized in the
Na-I-design where the fission gas plenum is at the lower end, but
putting it on the top of the fuel pL~ probably does not change the
situation drastically.
We realize that all considerations of this chapter with the exception
of the plugging and superheating accident do not lead to any larger
accident in case the safety system works, in particular we realize
that the size of the Na-void effect did not influence our consider-
ations. The mechanism of the plugging and superheating accident
requires therefore further thorough investigations. But the accidents
of the type a) - d) lead to a major damage in case of a simultaneous
failure of the safety system. The sequence of events leading to such
a major damage all involve the Na-voiding of major parts of the core.
This leads to the maximum hypothetical accident.
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'~e start with the assumption of a reactivity ramp insertion as
it was discussed under b) in the last chapter. The accidents
discussed there are of such a low value, that sodium boiling
starts before fuel melting ends and vaporization of the fuel
starts. In the case of thc Na-1-design the limit for these reac-
tivity ~amps is 3 $/sec. We also assume that the safety system
fails to react. Now it i6 not sufficient to assume that the
boiling begins at the upper end of the core where the sodium
void effect is negative. According to the argument of Smidt ~-3_7
we have to assume unstab~e flow conditions and in this case voi-
ding starts at the center of the core at the place of the lar-
gest positive void effect. If one wants to evaluate the ramp
rate associated with Na-voiding, the situation is as folIows:
The original calculation of the maximum integral void effect
in the Na-1-reference design gives a maximum value of 3 % for
sodium voiding, the latest results indicate a higher value close
to 7 %. In the analysis of this accident the uncertainty of the
nuclear calculation of the void effect appears for the first
time to be of relevance. If one wants to continue to evaluate
the naximum ramp rate a second uncertainty appears, namely that
of the time scale of throwing out the sodium. Here the full scope
of the Na two phase flow appears. As Fischer and Häfele show in
their paper ~-10_7 for low amounts of gas in the tNO phase mix-
ture one has to expect a rather low value of the velocity of
sound Ceasily as low as 10 m/sec). This means that all kind of
shock wave complications have to be expected in the pattern of
flow. The time scale is probably uncertain to a much higher de-
gree than the reactivity value of voiding. Both uncertainties
combine if the ramp rate is calculated. Presently we bridge this
difficulty by simply assuming a ramp rate of 100 %/sec.
Following the original initiating excursion one finds, that to-
gether with the boiling of Na the fuel melts. The FORE analysis
indicates that the hotter part of the fuel is already malten when
the Na starts boiling. If the molten fuel touches the can the heat
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resistance in the gap disappears and the temperature of the clad-
ding is suddenly increased for about 5000 C. The immediately fol-
lowing formation of bubbles of Na vapor is consistent with
the above mentioned second uncertainty of the time scale for Na-
voiding. This formation of bubbles of Na vapor means that there
might be a Na steam explosion of the BORAX type.
After the melting of the can fuel compaction inside and outside
of the original fuel element could start. This would lead to an-
other reactivity rampe Both ramps, that of the Na-voiding and
that cf fuel compaction, would add if the two involved mechanical
processes would not interfere. They would lead to a nuclear ex-
cursion and subsequent explosion. Superimposed is the Na-steam
BORAX type explosion.
We have not yet a clear idea on the patterns of the interactions
of these two processes. Here is another open problem of great im-
portance.
It is useful to realize the difference between this kind of an
analysis and that fer a small reactor with metallic fuel elements
like EFFBR or EBR 11. There we have a negative void effect. Any
displacement of somewhat larger amounts of Na shuts the reactor
down, the two ramps involved there subtract and don't add as
above. The metal fuel melts easily and drops to the bottem of the
core and may form a second critical mass down there. This second
critical mass is not at the place of the first critical mass, the
core. The excursion in this second critical mass is known as
second excursion which constitutes the JlHA (or possibly maximum
credible accident). In our case the place for the accidential ex-
cursion is more at the place of the original core and the BORAX
type Na-steam explosion is superimposedj the ramps add up and there
is no time for a quiet melt down.
The plugging and superheating accident for the central subassembly
can develop to a similar final picture as described above. Sudden
desuperheat destroys the central subassembly and its neighbours.
The probable interruption of the coolant flow there leads to Na-
boiling (or Na superheat, which in turn would increase the area of
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subassembly destruction even further by arepetition of this
mechanism). The ejection of Na of a somewhat greater number of
subassemblies leads now to a reactivity ramp of a relevant height
and could initiate the scram rods. But here we have to assume that
even if the safety system as such works the safety rods don't drop
into the core because of mechanical distortions there. Now the se-
quence of events develops similar to the above described picture.
In spite of all this the amount of kinetic energy build up in an
excursion of a given ramp rate was calculated by Ott, Böhm ~-12_7
and later by Küsters. They used a Bethe-Tait approach using a
spherical model for the supercritical mass. It is realized that
H 1
extremely flat cores of, say, D = 6 may better use a slab model
which should give smaller energy releases. This will be done in
the forthcoming months.
Following the Bethe-Tait type calculation another uncertainty is
to realize. This is the uncertainty of the equation of state for
a realistic fuel, that is a mixture of UOZ-PuOZ and fission pro-
ducts containing fission gases to a various degree.
At Karlsruhe originally an equation derived from the measurements
of Ackermann ~-13_7 were used. This led to a rather quick pressure
build up and limited the energy release nicely. But then we de-
tected the large difference against the energy release obtained
by the use of the ~olfe-I:eyer ~-14_7 equation of state. To have
a safe approach we now use only this equation of state. The Doppler
coefficient is included in the calculation. This results in a re-
markable reduction of the energy release. The following table gives
the total energy release and that of kinetic energy for different
values of the Doppler coefficient at Z5000K, the initial flux and
two ramp rates.
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Table 4
--
UR = 500 %/sec.
-----------1-----
:c: ~kg TN:!,7-fDC eTo I
...
- 8
·
10-6 1010 256
1014 48
1018 114
- 4
·
10-6 1010 539
1014 84
1018 280
- 1
·
10-6 10 10 5 474
1014 2 848
1018 882
0 1010 29 814
1014 18 112
I 1018 8 830
I
1--l-
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aR = 100 $/sec.
DC .,. E ~kg TN!7('0
~
- 8 • 10-6 10'0 34
10 14 7.4
1018 17
-6 1010 79- 4 • 10
1014 85
1018 39
- 1 . 10-6 10 10 43
1014 284
1018 239
0 1010 6 019
10 14 4 196
1018 2 055
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The Na-1-reference design has a Doppler coefficient betwe~n 6
8 -6 4 0 0and • 10 at 1 00 K. At 2500 K this leads to a value of 3.3
4 -6and .5' 10 respectively. The correct value of the Doppler
coefficient and the initial flux is a principal difficulty in
calculating the energy release.
-6 8Assuming a value of 4.10 for the Doppler gives 5 kg of TIJT
for 100 %/sec and 9 = 1014 --~-- , at 500 %/sec WB have for
10 n 0 cm sec§ = 10 --2::- 539 kg instead.
o cm sec
A major experimental effort is in preparation at Karlsruhe in
order to investigate the equation of state experimentally.
8. The Design Basis Accident (DQA)_~g~_!~_Q~sig~~f_!tf_Q~~ai~~
ment
About a year ago when the Karlsruhe reference design, Nd-1, neare~
its completicn the uncertainty cf calculating the enerßY release
in case of a MHA was larger than it appears today. So it W2S ce-
cided to accept in case of the Na-1-design the philosophy that
the safety system does not fail. Reporting on the results of the
third Geneva Conference W. Häfele and P. Engelmann pointed out
that this philosophy is accepted by many fast reactor grou~s /-15 7.
The mechanism of the plugging and superheating mechanism was not
yet detected. This excludes the HHA as a DB4. The DBA is therefore
a large sodium fire. The st2el container is designed to withstand
this maximu~ pressure of 2.5 atü. But it is highly unprobable that
this pressure builds up because only a fraction of the sodium can
probably go to fire. Namely all the compartments containing the
primary circuit have a nitrogen atmosphere and only the case of a
major explosion, which is excluded here, could lead to such a fire
of all the sodium. The diameter of the containment building is only
28 o. It results from the size of the primary circuit. Its heic~t
is determined by the installation and main~~nance or repair proce-
dures of the components of the primary circuit. At the i~sice of
the steel containment a layer of concrete prct8cts 2:einst te~~cr~­
ture of a fire ane mechanical damages.
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The Na-1-reference design shows already some neighbourhood to the
two containment solution of the SEFOR reactor. The DBA there is
a nuclear explosion of 90 kg TNT. It will be contained in the com-
partments of the concrete structure of the primary loop. The second
container, the steel shell, in the case of SEFOR, shall withstand
the pressure of an overall sodium fire. Therefore it will not be
too difficult to extend the Na-1-reference design to a DBA of the
SEFOR type. To exclude the MHA as a DBA is therefore a less severe
assumption. In the forthcoming weeks an effort will start in order
to evaluate the capital cost potential of such change of philosophy.
Thereafter the basis for the DBA of the Na-2-design will be selec-
ted.
9. 9.~~~ Cost~-2.!.-!g~-lia-1=~~~~~~..Q~ig~_itsA~~~~~!~
Potentia!_for_~~~du~!~2~~~~!~-9.omEetitionwith Breedin~_and
Sa!ety..:.
One of the objectives of the Na-1-reference design was to Get a
rough idea on the costs and its distribution in order to use this
information as a guidance for further research and development
work.
The fuel costs are 0.3 DPf/kWh = 0.75 %mills/kWh at a Pu price
of 10 $/g. This includes interest for inventory, refabrication,
reprocessing and the first core. It also includes the sale of bred
material. The capital costs are 462.6 IIio DJvl = 116.0 Mio $ or 116 $/k'Ne.
The 462.6 Mio DM are the sum of 262.6 flio Dlvl for the conventional
part = 58 % of the total capital costs. 200.0 Eio DM are assumed
to be the costs for the reactor part, that is 42 % of the total
sumo But the actual capital cost evaluation led to a value of only
116.95 I'1io DI1, 83.05 Mio DM are considered to be a "contingency"
due to general uncertainties in the area of costs for large Na com-
ponents. If this "contingency" is excluded, the total sum is only
380.0 Mio DM = 95 $/kWe with 68 % for the conventional part and
only 32 % for the reactor part.
-25-
-25-
The amount of 116.95 Mio DM = 29 Mio $ = 100 %shall now be the
referenee value for eomparisons. 11 Mio $ = 38 % is for the pumps,
all the deviees of the eooling eireuits provide 19 Mio $ = 65 ~
of the total costs of the reaetor part. The reactor itself gives
only 5 Mio $, that is 17 %.
The reactor building should be in the order of 6 Mio $.
As being reported in the paper cf Smidt (-3_7 also the change frem
oxide te carbide fuel was eonsidered. There are two ways to use
the better properties of the carbides: It is possible to use the
same rod power and to enjoy the higher breeding ratio, both inter-
nal and external and the lower average temperature only, or to
operate the reaetor at higher rod power additionally. Smidt's
analysis indieates, that in the seeond ease an aeeordingly higher
eooling flux of sodium is required. This leads te higher pressure
drops in the primary cireuit and therefore to more expensive pumps
and more structural material fer the subassemblies, which in turn
lowers the breeding ratio. The hiGher eost for the pumps nearly
outbalance the gain in fuel cycle cost, if they are capitalized
over aperiod of 15 years at 9.7 %. The two choices to use the
carbides instead of the oxides result in nearly the same cast re-
duetion of about 20 rHo DH = 5 rHo $.
We already saw, that the components of the eoolant circuits are
the area with the largest potential for possible cost reduction.
In the Na-1-study we used cheap ferritie steel wherJever it was
possible therefore. Up to now the cheap SS of the 304 or 316 type
are forbidden for high temperature use. If, however, the use of
these eheap SS were permitted, the thermal effieieney could be
increased by perhaps 5 %. This could lead te a deerease ef 0.2 m~~~s
at 80 % load faeter. One sheuld realize here, that already a de-
crease of about 0.3 m~~~~ is the incentive fer the light water super-
heat development. The penalty fer the change from the ferritic to the
mills
cheap 55 would ameunt to enly 0.03 kW~. If on the other hand we
continue to be foreed to use a x8 er Ni Nb 16 13 type of 55 gain
and loss of costs may just eaneel each other. The optimization of
effieiency - capital eosts and fuel cycle costs requires further
attention.
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If one tries to evaluate this cost situations one arrives at the
following conclusions:
a) the carbides have a cost advantage over 5 % with respect to the
assuming that the fuel cycle cost are capitalized over 15 years
at 9.7 %. This advantage is larcc enough to be interesting, but
it is not so large that the Karlsruhe group would follow a paral-
lel development of both, the oxides and the carbides. The deve-
lopment of the carbide fuel is a meaningful second step. It also
gives higher breedinG and in case of the same rod power as in
the case of the oxides the advantage of a higher inherent safety.
Cost advantage, safety and bree~ing all tend in the same direc-
tion.
b) Among the more direct reactor costs it is definitely the part
of the Na-components which has the largest cost potential. In
particular the pumps are very expensive and for pumps a weIl
targeted development program is advisable. But also the ques-
tions of materials of the Na-circuits and -components are of
interest, especially on the background of present engineering
regulatory rules in Germany. The situation there entrances a
serious consideration of the use of cheap ferritic steel in
competition with the question of thermal efficiency.
c) The reactor buildin[ of the Na-1 is a 6 % item of the whole
plant. A more complicated building on the two container prin-
ciple being able to withstand explosion of, say, 100 - 200 kg
TNT is subject of further investigation. It is estimated to in-
crease the cost from 6 to 7 or 8 % of the total costs. There-
fore this does not result in a heavy competition between safety
and economics.
d) The reactor itself is a 5 % item. Therefore any complication
there which appears to be necessary for safety or breeding
again does not afflict heavily the economics.
Generally one can say that the often cited competition between
economy, safety and breeding da es exist, but is not too heavy.
In the case of fuel all three aspects are favourablv afflicted
----_....
by the use of the carbides.
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1) A 1000 MWe fast breeder reactor with Na cooling appears techni-
cally feasible.
2) The safety properties of such a reactor do not seem to consti-
tute a major safety problem. Soft accidential reactivity inser-
tions as defined in chapter 6, that is below 0.25 %, can be
accepted in the Na-1-reference design without the action of
the safety system. More severe reactivity insertions require
the use of a rather conventional safety system (about 50 m sec
delay time before mechanical movement starts).
3) The Doppler coefficient allows for the use of such a rather
conventional safety system und guarantees over all stability.
But its actual size does not have too large an impact on these
design characteristics. In case the safety system works the
size of the Na-void effect does not have a larger feed back
on the design.
4) ~ithin the realm of a working safety system the recently de-
tected plugging and superheating accident of a central sub-
assembly requires further attention.
5) If the safety system can fail major accidents are possible.
Here the size of the Na-void effect is of great importance.
Its positive sign leads to an addition of the ramp rates due
to Na-voiding and fuel compaction. Both, the nuclear excursion
and a Na-steam explosion superimpose. The Doppler coefficient
decreases remarkably the release of kinetic energy.
6) Work should be done in the area of:
a) the nuclear evaluation of the Na-void effect
b) two phase flovv of Na
c) Na-steam explosion and the mechanism of core destruction.
d) the equation of state of a realistic oxide fuel
breeding ratio
af fast breeder)
is ata Na-1-reference design
100 %
---- the
kWh '
population
7) The expected fuel cycle cast for
mills .0.7 -kWh-' The capltal casts are at
is at. 1.4, the daubling time (of a
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is about 7 years. This is very satisfactory ~-16_7.
8) The choice of fuel is oxide. Carbide could lead to a decrease
of the order of 5 % of the total eosts (over 15 years). The
development of a carbide fuel is therefore meaningful as a
second fuel development after the oxide fuel. Carbide fuel
cannot be used in a steam cooled design.
9) The components of the eooling circuits make up nearly 65 %
cf the cost of the more direct reactor part. The pumps alone
give 38 56. Careful development of cheap large Na components
is in that sense important. The cost optimum between Na outlet
temperature, that is thermal efficiency, and capital costs re-
quires further attention.
10) The principle of large fast breeder reactors is to have fuel
1 millcyele costs be ow 1 kWh-. Therefore large seale fuel testing
MWd
up to a burn up of 100 000 itö as a problem of long testing
times is of great importance.
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APPENDIX
1. General Data
---------
Reactor Type Reterogeneous Fast Breeder
Reactor Power Thermal
Electrical
Fuel
(rlW
th )
(rUfe)
2 500
1 000
87 % theoret. Den-
sity
Fertile Material
Coolant Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
U02 , U-Hetal
Na
Na
Total Breeding Ratio
Doubling Time (1/3 out of
Pile Inventory) - for a
Population of Fast Breeders
2. Reactor
2.1 Reactor Core
2.1.1 f~!ruction and Composition
Form
(-)
(a)
Upright Zylinder
1,385
7,2
Total Diameter
Total Height
Fuel Region Diameter
Height
(mm)
(mm)
(mm)
(mm)
3 766
1 755
2 860
955
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Total Number of Zones in Radial Direction
(numbered from the Center outward)
-3°-
H/D Ratio
Thickness of Blanket Radial
Axial
in Fuel Region
in Radial Blanket Region
Total Number of Cells
in Fuel Region
in Radial Blanket Region
Form of Cell
;'Jidth over Flats
Overall Length of Subassembly
~eight of Fuel Subassembly
Weight of U0 2-Blanket Subas-
sembly
Weight of U-Metal Blanket
Subassembly
(- )
(mm)
(mm)
(-)
(-)
(- )
(-)
(-)
Hexagonal
(mm)
(mm)
(kp)
(kp)
(kp)
1/3
400
400
4
2
2
397
229
168
178,5
3 790
315
427
587
Thickness of Subassembly
Cladding
Diameter of Fuel Pin
Diameter of Blanket Pin
Cladding Thickness of Fuel Pin
Volume Ratio Cladding/Fuel
(mm) 4
(mm) 6,7
(mm) 11,3
(mm) 0,35
(- ) 0,25
Cladding Thickness of Blanket
Pin
Volume Ratio Cladding/Fertile
Naterial
Cladding Material
(mm)
( -)
Incoloy 800
0,6
0,25
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Number of Fuel Pins per Sub-
assembly
Number of Blanket Pins per Sub-
assembly
Fission Gas Plenum (below)
Max. Fission Gas Pressure in
Fuel Pin
(-)
(-)
(mm)
2(kp/cm )
Zone 1
331
169
800
70
Zone 2
Outer Diameter
Number of Cells
Volume Fraction
Coolant
Structural Materials
Fissile Material
Fertile Material
Number of Fuel Subassemblies
Number of Control Rod Sub-
assemblies
Fraction of Total Coolant
per Fuel Cells
Fraction of Structural
Material per Fuel Cell
Outer Diameter
Number of Cells
Number of Blanket Sub-
assemblies
Volume Fraction
Coolant
(mm)
(-)
<v/o)
(v/o)
(v/o)
<v/o)
(-)
(-)
(-)
( -)
(mm)
(-)
(-)
<v/o}
2 053
118
50,0
19,6
3,2
27,2
105
12
0,465
0,121
Zone 3
3 213
60
60
29,8
2 860
111
105
6
0,465
0,121
Zone 4
3 766
108
108
29,8
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Structural Materials
Fertile Material
2.1.2 Thermodynami~_~~
(v/o)
(v/o)
21,9
48,3
21,9
48,3
Thermal Power Core
Blanket Axial
Blanket Radial
Coolant Inlet Temperature
Nax. Outlet Temperature
Avg. Outlet Temperature
Max. Coolant Velocity
Pressure Loss
in Core
in Axial Blanket
in Fission Gas Plenum
Max. Fuel Temperature
Max. Heat Flux
(MW ) 2 410th
01Wth ) 48
(MWth ) 42
(oC) 430
(oC) 630
(oe) 580
(m/ sec) 6,6
2 1,25(kp/cm )
2(kp/cm ) 1,05
2 1,05(kp/cm )
(oC) 2 412
2 334(W/cm )
Hydraulic Diameter in Fuel Region
Ratio of Avg. to Max. Power Radial
Axial
Hot Channel Factors
Coolant Heating
Heat Transfer Coefficient
Rod Power
Nax. Rod Power (W/em)
(-) 1,33
(- ) 1,25
(-) 1,24
(mm) 6,8
(-) 0,82
(- ) 0,80
Zone 1 Zone 2
566 539
Ratio of Avg. to Hax. Power
Radial (-)
Axial (-)
0,897
0,80
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0,745
0,80
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Constants
Max. Heat Transfer Coeffieient
between Cladding and Coolant
Thermal Conductivity of
Cladding (600°c)
Heat Transfer Coeffieient
between Fuel and Cladding
Thermal Conduetivity of Fuel
(i'llem 2 • oC)
(W/em.oC)
8,4
0,21
0,75
0,032
Critieal Mass (Pu-239 + Pu-241) (kg) 2 015
Total Neutron Flux at Core
Center
Effeetive Neutron Lifetime
Effeetive Fraetion of Delayed
Neutrons
Worth of a Fuel Subassembly
6K
at Core Center 1f
Doppler Constant
A T (1 dK)Dopp = • iCCiT
1 dKDoppler Coeffieient KOdT
-2 -1)(ern .see
( sec)
(%)
($)
(-)
($)
( -)
0,3548
1,°
-2
- 1,19·10
Greatest Possible Reaetivity Worth
due to Partial Loss of Na ~~ (-) 0,01108
($) 3,06
Na Ternperature Coeffieient (oC- 1 ) -63,925 0 10
Breeding Ratio Zone 1 (-) 0,556
Zone 2 (- ) 0,334
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Axial Blanket ( -) 0,254
Radial Blanket (-) 0,241
Total (- ) 1,385
Zone 1 Zone 2
Fuel Composition:
Pu-239 (a/o) 9,8726 12,9028
Pu-24o (a/o) 4,7013 6,1442
Pu-241 (a/o) 0,7835 1,0241
Pu-242 (a/o) 0,3134 0,4096
U-238 (a/o) 84,3292 79,5193
Enrichment Fissionable
Pu/(Pu+U) {a/o} 10,6561 13,9269
Atom Ratio Fertile/Fissile
Material (o.) 8,3843 6,1803
Volume Ratio Fertile/Fis-
sile Material ( ... ) 8,7110 6,4083
Cempositien Blanket Material U-235
U-238
Core Volume
(a/e)
(a/e)
(ltr)
0,7
99,3
6 132
Rating Hax. (MW/kg~Pu..239+Pu-2427) 2,14
(Kw/cm3~Pu02+u02_7) 2,0
Avg. (MW/kg/Pu-239+Pu-2417) 1,196
.. -
(Kw/cm3(pu02+U02_7) 1,285
Burn Up Hax. (Axial Average) (M'Vd/t(Ü+P~7> 100 000
Avg. (f4Wd/t(ü+p~7) 85 000
Power Density Hax. (NW/ltr.) 0,599
Avg. (MW/ltr. ) 0,393
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2.2 E~ac tor .v~~el
Total Height (mm) 16 900
Outer Diameter (mm) 7 900
Thickness of Wall (mm) 30
Care Support Grid Plate
Diameter (mm) 4 500
Height (mm) 1 300
Haterial x8 Cr Ni Nb 16 13
eventually 10 Cr Mo Ni Nb 9 10
Max. Permissible Temperature
of Containment (oC) 480
Hax. Permissible Pressure
on Containment 2 6(kp/cm )
3. Erim~EY L.2~
3·1 Pipelines and Pumps
Coolant Volume (m3 ) 780
Activity of Coolant Na 24 (C/cm3) 1,36.10-1
Na 22 (C/cm3) 2.10-6
Diameter of Pipe from Reactor
to Intermediate Heat Exchanger (mm) 1 700
Coolant Velocity in Pipe (rn/sec) 3,5
Diameter of Coaxial Pipe frorn
Intermediate Heat Exchanger
to Reactor inside (mm) 1 900
outside (mm) 2 200
Coolant Velocity in Pipe (m/sec) 7,7
Number of Pumps (-) 4
Power Input of each Pump (KVJ) 2 940
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Flow Rate through each Pump
Pressure Loss in Primary Loop
Coolant Avg. Circuit Time
(kg/sec)
2(kp/cm )
(sec)
3 296
5,6
62,4
Intermediate Heat Exchanger
---------------
Number of Exchangers 2
Type: Helical Tube Counter Current Heat Exchanger
2 792
(mm) 16 000
(mm) 4 600
(m3) 125
(m3) 50
(-) 4 385
(mm) 20'X1,5
x8 Cr Ni Nb 16 13
10 Cr Ho Ni Nb 9 10
Volume of Coolant Primary
Secondary
Material
eventually
Surface Area per Heat Exchanger (m2 )
Total Height
Outer Diameter
Number of Exchanger Tubes
Diameter of Tubes
Avg. Log. Temperature
Difference 40
Max. Temperature Difference
between Surfaces 70
Coolant Flow Rate per
Exchanger
Pressure Loss
Coolant Velocity between the
Tubes
Coolant Inlet Temperature
Outlet Temperature
(kg/h)
2(kp/cm )
1,6
580
430
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~~~~~~~!:l_~!~~
Coolant Flow Rate per
Exchanger
Pressure 1055
Coolant Velocity in the Tubes
Coolant Inlet Temperature
Outlet Temperature
(kg/h)
2(kp/cm )
(m/sec)
(oC)
(oC)
17,75.106
2,63
5,9
360
560
-38-
Ref~~~~
{.-1_7 W. Häfele et al.: "The Karlsruhe Fast Breeder Project fl
II1. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy, Geneva 1964, A/Conf. 28/p/539
{.-z_7 D. Smidt, A. Hüller et al.: "Referenzstudie für den 1000 HWe
natriumgekühlten schnellen Brutreaktor (Na-1)"
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, KFK-Report Nr. 299
(December 1964)
{.-3_7 D. Smidt et al.: "Safety and Cost Analysis of a 1000 MWe
Sodium Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor"
Argonne-Conference, October 1965
{.-4_7 C. P. Zaleski, D. Smidt et al.: "Fast Reactor Core Design
and Safety Studies in France and in the Federal Republic
of Germany"
National Topical Meeting on Fast ~eactor Technology, Detroit,
April 1965, ANS-100
/-5 7 w. Häfele: "Principles and Problems of the Development of a
Fast Reactor Fuel Element"
Conference on Breeding, Economics and Safety in Large Fast
Power Reactors, Argonne, October 1963, ANL-6792
/-6 7 D. Smidt,.V. Sommer: "Applic:3.tion of the Vented Fuel Concept
to a Sodium Cooled Power Breeder with 1000 fvTWe"
Argonne Conference, October 1965
{.-7_7 K. ütt, A. Jansen: "Long-Time Behaviour of Fast Breeders"
IAEA-Seminar on the Physics of Fast and Intermediate Reac-
tors, Vienna, August 1961, SM-18/z
{.-8_7 K. Ott, S. Yiftah et al.: "A Comparison of Different Calcu-
lated Doppler Coefficients of Large Fast Breeder Reactors"
Argonne Conference, October 1965
{.-9_7 K. H. Küsters: "On the Evaluation of Group Constant Sets
for the Calculation of Large Fast Reactors"
Argonne Conference, October 1965
-39-
[-10_7 w. Häfele, D. Smidt, M. fischer: "Hydrodynamics of Two-
Phase Fluid Expulsion from a Reactor Coolant Channel under
High Heat Supply"
Argonne Conference, October 1965
[-11_7 G. Friz: "Coolant Ejection Studies with Analogy Experiments"
Argonne Conference, October 1965
[-12_7 H. Böhm: "Parameter Dependence of After-Heltdown Accidents"
Conference on Breeding, Economics and Safety in Large Fast
Power Reactors, Argonne, October 1963 ANL-6792
[-13_7 R. I. Ackermann et al.: "High-Temperature Thermodynamic
Properties of U02"
Journal of Chemical Physics, Vol. 25, Nr. 6 (Dec. 1956)
~-14_7 B. 'Nolfe, R. A. Meyer: "High-Temperature Equation of State
of UO "2
Trans. Amer. Nucl. Soc., Vol. 7, Nr. 1 (1964)
~-15_7 W. Häfele, P. Engelmann: "Fast Reactor Programms"
(III. Geneva Conference) Nuclear News - ANS, Vol. 7
Nr. 10 (1964)
(-16_7 H. Grümm, D. Gupta, W. Häfele, P. Jansen, E. Schmidt,
J. Seetzen et al.: "Demand for Nuclear Fuels and Costs
of Different Reactor Types in Germany"
Deutsches Atomforum e.V. and Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe,
FORATOM-Kongress, Frankfurt, September 1965
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, KFK-Report Nr. 366
I ' ~
l-._._ .-i-._._.---L--_t
3766·
32tJ~
2660'
2053'
I t
! f 00~
!
i a b c: d r ~
I
0
• 0~
9 1
a innrrr Spaltzonr {Zon.1j
b äunrrr SpttltzOn. (Zon.2 )
c innKr Brutzon. (Zon,3)
d ÖUßK' Brutzon. (Zon.l,)
• emt.r. allittt. Brllfzon.
f ObK. ttllirJl. Brutzon.
9 SPt1tt~Jsp#;ch"
Abb. 1 Zonenaufteilung des Reaktorkernes
r//////
~~~r;;
v
=- ~RNktClt'beMl"
I V / ~~
~ ~~v
I
1·
.......... 111-
I
I
I
t
"'Dt".ialschl~se
~~
~
~~~
//////hll~) TransportflOSche", 7' ,~~ :--- t:/...- ~
.--'-I--Mr - ...,__ ~ :
~
~IY
----i-I --
Abb. 2 8,- Einschleusen der Transportbehälter in den
R8'aktorbehälter
iv
,
'I I ;
I i I
UIw-----H-,4-------11
~ ~
---.....--
Hall'fJlolI.
Abb. 2 b Vorbere~tung des Reaktors für den Brennstoff-
.echsel
P.,.iskop
11
Abb. 2 c Brennato!twechael unter Xatriua
56000
+=--
mm
mm
lIIID
lIIID
17500
---l--+------t---
----------------r--------------- 15000 ----------------j
D
$D
J 5m
~ ~ ,~ .g hl~ ~ i)!i! ~~~ ~ t&: ~ ,§V) "'~
- -
1000MW~ SChMl/t>,. 8rut~r No 1
~ r-,.. ... -
......- -:- ...-
_.
3
o0 :; D
0
0
'"
C
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0
C
0,
0
'50ox,,!,le~1..1n2
C
cil 11 ~
-~-
i \
"
--t
/ \
o
ZWlsch~nwormeauslauscher C
- --- - -- ----------
o
Schruft'lprlouf
o
Schf1ltl A-B
----------~-----.-----_.
o '
o
1000MWe SChn~f1er8rut~r Na 1
SclYNtt C-D
Sm
, ,~
o
o
-. - ~
'\
0
a ::
e "
0
"
z
o
iJ
=
t\
1\
I \
I
I
I
I
1
I
I
I
.0.
----- ..........................
Gii Q, II __ , II/!I ~_--0-_ ,
1 r Beschlckungs =TE'stzE'lIe u
manipulator
-
~
aum (ur ~Bedlenungsr ungssystf'mPnmar Na - Reltvg
No-Pump~PrImar
Ausglf'Ic.~sJ~ltung
ZWlschf!'nwor_m_, = ___
tausch pr
I000MWe Schneller Bruler Na 1
5
Eraot~ !t'r
f".IJ/durch
Schnlrtv~rlouf
Gen//~ho"'Or KemfO'lC/HInIJ
ob"
7500 Karl3rllh~
P<lcffacj,9'r
f
....~'''' Horizonlalschnill
durch das Reaklorgebaude1.50
5mo
\
\
\_---------{'==~""-
~,}\
\
\,
•
)
,z 11 10
..... :
c
c
~
,
---+----
-- . ---~--
006f1------,..;...---
,~, ~---\
---<'~,--- ---.:.' ,/'~I'
~.', ---1-/
",'\ f'
( -I
!
~
'<:(
~i
t,
,
0
. :2 ~IVi, , ~ ,-~' Cl ~~ ':: ".1 t, r-.. "" E~; ~ ~ - r öl:;; -" .i; ~I~: ~ -'~ .", ! ~l ~l~ i E ~ ~, E·"< ~ i '-' 0'U') ~ , e. ~i"'. ~ .,'"" " ~~:tl
\ \+-- \\ \
\
\
\
\
\
I:)'
~--_.
\~\­
\\
j
!
I
I
Ii~'~-='========-=====_=_=_=======-- ==rI'""":"":'=-:-::=-----=====--==------:---=----------.---_-1_
H0,
c:
=l
I
!1I A:
6 II
"-~_I
Er_zf(Jr
E(Hfl'd",,~
i
!
o..n.tJhoftfSr/(""tonalHutg
••H
7500 Karl8rub.
PNffooIt ,..7
1000/vl We Schneller Bruler Na 1
Vertikalschnitt
durch den Reaktor1:25Ho••17091
"""--~-I~~~--J~~-"~~-I-"
1000 IS00mm
/
o 500
\
:G
\
t;i0'~:
0,
~:
~
\
\
\
\
.. ,
<>
<>
~
,
:-------i---.~~- -~-
0--
--~----~---~ ~---------- -6 ---j-----~-~~5- ------
\
7
Isolierung
o
Tra anker
Schnitt A-D
Tragzylinder
Spornführung
Schockbleche
Reaklorbehälter
Kühlmilleleinlrilt
Kühlmiltelaus Irilt
8
c8
D
E
7
La er/a f
KiJhlmiltelleitz /inder
Hubrahr der Halle lalle
Trans ar/behälter
Abströmkanal
Führungsla er fürBeschickun s
manipula-lor
An/riebss/an e für Steuerstab
Hallepla//e
---------
1000 MWe Schneller Brüter Na 1
7
3
------'-------::2-------.----------,--.------- --
Nam"T.g ,
0..",-...1<1>0, I _ ! v : 'IV I '1'1'1 1'1'1'1'1 I II~~--- F,~jmaßfo/.,anz :1----+=--=-;~'-=--+--'='-+'"'--""'-+-=-=IRauhl"'-_"';"IJ I 1000 i 40 I 10 : • I ',6 :1,11-1:::9-,---::T.,--9'---T----'--,N7am--o-'---r---J.-:-:Wo.:..rk:-',~o,;-;"t--I----I(,-em--Jrea~kto-'--r.L--'-+:-:-:--:-:-=--:--J~-'--..L-:":""_IA
o 500 1000 1500mm goz. !1l1UVI~6!wr~"-- 1 8.u••. 80lrloln-Go..lt..haflm.b.H.I--::--.,. --!
.-I::l--=:::J--=====-___ gopr. i---- ..k~=='___ _I Karlsruhe ErI.lz tDr
1.J!7"'"":-",...,-_-i-:::- -L. -L. +'::Er"'"""ze.:
'
d~u:.:roh:::_----_1
M.a.I.b 180..·nung Hor iZ 0 n taIschni tt Zeichnung, Nr.
1:25 I durch den Reaktor
~---~---'----------
11
o
10
;
?iliL
'''-r'
!
i
3
ffRCsi.
Y
---l-
i
--I
I
--I
1-+-+--+---C::::j}-~
S.kundarkr.lso<
2 ----t--f--t-
zur
Relf'llglJngsonlag~
Um wafzpumpt' ----
van
R~mfgungsanlage
----'""'1
Q R
rum AblalJsystem
Prtmar1<rP/s J RPoktor
____ run
:.:c::; ",.Ost.(TjDSI" proB
)' ;1)
______-_~_-_-=_::_~.:.5-__=__=__=_- _-__.:.':::-_-_~_-:=_::.:..-_-_-_-_-_-_--_-_-..:-'::::::_-_-~_-_-_-~3_- :..._ ~ __.:. ""_ -, 1
- .. zum Abloßsystf'm
Sekundar-
kreise
__/1
/
;r:=:>--+---L--+~/
F'i
~, Meßste-lle
T DS' pro BlE
\~ I' 3TIE
L- ...L- -tl~ zum Ablaßsystem
PrimOr kreiS 11
1000 MWe Schneller Bruler Na 1
oi
c
r.,f SIOt:/fT',----:."'_="=":------:_=_=-f-:A=_..,=:-+.:z.=••="'=.-,,.,-:-=f--."'-:::""=,,c:-,-l
. '°9
CNH/J.chafl ffJI' K_for~"9
m"
75(){) Karluuhe
Pwtfac." ,.7
Schema des Primärsystems
ZII lchtJ
E!!iiz~!
[ruU/durch
-.-'2--~---1-----1i--
Schnitt A-B
M 1'1
/74,5 - -
10
z
I
1 -
Einzelheit Z
M 2.1
Ansicht A
M 1:5
---------
u~
g
...,
------ - - -"50----------~-17.. ----------- 400 ------- - -- ----- --------- -- 955------
Bruts(o{( SpolJstoff
r--B
--- - --]790 - -
M 1:5
400--
Brutstoff
--ff] --- - -a~~:~----------
f------------ --
I
1--------- -- - 60 - -
I
.. 15- -$-~-----'OO­
Brutsfoff
955
Spoltstoff
2572
Brennstoffstab
